From: the_dojang-owner@hpwsrt.cup.hp.com To: the_dojang-digest@hpwsrt.cup.hp.com Subject: The_Dojang-Digest V8 #471 Reply-To: the_dojang@hpwsrt.cup.hp.com Errors-To: the_dojang-owner@hpwsrt.cup.hp.com Precedence: The_Dojang-Digest Thur, 9 Aug 2001 Vol 08 : Num 471 In this issue: the_dojang: Re: A sad day in my Dojang the_dojang: RE: Take it back. the_dojang: Re: A sad day in my Dojang the_dojang: Re: The_Dojang-Digest V8 #468 the_dojang: Re: The_Dojang-Digest V8 #469 the_dojang: Re: The_Dojang-Digest V8 #470 the_dojang: Belt the_dojang: Still with it the_dojang: KSR 2001-15: _Generals and Scholars_, by Edward J. Shultz the_dojang: . ========================================================================= The_Dojang, serving the Internet since June 1994. ~1000 members strong! Copyright 1994-2001: Ray Terry and Martial Arts Resource The premier internet discussion forum devoted to the Korean Martial Arts. Replying to this message will NOT unsubscribe you. To unsubscribe, send "unsubscribe the_dojang-digest" (no quotes) in the body (top line, left justified) of a "plain text" e-mail addressed to majordomo@hpwsrt.cup.hp.com. To send e-mail to this list use the_dojang@hpwsrt.cup.hp.com See the Korean Martial Arts (KMA) FAQ and the online search engine for back issues of The_Dojang at http://www.MartialArtsResource.com Pil Seung! ---------------------------------------------------------------------- From: SallyBaughn@aol.com Date: Thu, 9 Aug 2001 10:11:30 EDT Subject: the_dojang: Re: A sad day in my Dojang Are there no other churches in your town? Also, if there's another owner/instructor you admire, perhaps he/she has room for you in their calendar. As I tell my son, all you waste is time to ask, and the worst they can do is tell you "No." Good luck. SallyBaughn@aol.com ------------------------------ From: Bruce.Sims@med.va.gov Date: Thu, 9 Aug 2001 10:20:04 -0500 Subject: the_dojang: RE: Take it back. Dear Illona: "....Yes, but he told this kid to turn in his uniform and his black belt ... this instance none were stripped of rank. How can you take a person's belt that they paid for and a uniform they paid for ... away from them ? I can see banishing them from the dojang ... I have done that in the past to some students to keep quality control here also ... but I didn't strip them of their uniforms or their belts....." I want you to know right up front that I admit that I don't know the circumstances or reasons that you might have had for asking a student to leave your school, so please don't take what I am about to say as a comment on your particular circumstances, okay? However, you asked how someone can take away a persons' belt/uniform that they paid for and my answer is--"very easily". If nothing else I hope that people who have read my posts at various times have heard me to say that what we are doing in the martial traditions is a lot more than (please God) selling techniques for cash. Now admittedly thats MY opinion and maybe there are people who are reading this right now who have made the decision that "kicks for cash" IS all that they are doing. Fine. I think its a mistake, but thats for another string. In the meantime, as a teacher, I am responsible for providing guidance and coaching to help the student come out of the best part of themselves. If they don't want what I have to offer, thats OK. What they are not going to do is take what I do and represent it as what they are doing. (This kinda gets back to that "copyright" string we had going here.) As far as I am concerned the belt and uniform represent that they have decided to walk a particular path and abide by a particular code of ethics and behavior. If they don't want to, or want to abide by a value system of someone else, I think they should follow their heart. I don't think they should be taking a belt and uniform with them that says that what they are doing is somehow a reflection of my coaching or guidance. There are somethings that money can't buy and when the belt and uniform were paid for, my authentification for what the student was doing went with them. Hope this makes sense. Best Wishes, Bruce ------------------------------ From: Richard Zaruba Date: Thu, 09 Aug 2001 10:32:22 -0500 Subject: the_dojang: Re: A sad day in my Dojang Mr. Rowe, Do you have a college or university in your area. They will usually allow a martial arts group to use their facilities. Sometimes they charge a small fee if the group is from outside the university (UND charges $3-6 per hour for usage). If you can start a university student organization the use of the facilities is usually free. Sincerely, Rich _______________________________________________________________________ Richard Zaruba Department of Anatomy & Cell Biology University of North Dakota School of Medicine 501 North Columbia Road P.O. Box 9037 Grand Forks, ND 58202-9037 zaruba@medicine.nodak.edu 701.777.3952 office 701.777.2576 lab 701.777.2477 fax ------------------------------ From: Chereecharmello@aol.com Date: Thu, 9 Aug 2001 11:58:15 EDT Subject: the_dojang: Re: The_Dojang-Digest V8 #468 I don't think it is right to force students to attend tournaments. As many-a-thread before has indicated, people study martial arts for various, often personal reasons. Competition does not always have a place in a student's personal martial arts ideology. I do agree that it shows a lack of respect to leave a tournament before all of your classmates have competed, however, what do you say to a parent who has spent 6 hours sitting on the side lines watching their child compete? Our tournaments are rather large and literally run for nearly 12 hours. There are few things I enjoying doing for that long a time period. ------------------------------ From: Chereecharmello@aol.com Date: Thu, 9 Aug 2001 12:11:48 EDT Subject: the_dojang: Re: The_Dojang-Digest V8 #469 << << I have tried the area YMCA's but of course they already have programs. I am out of options now so for a brief time the Dan Il Kwan will be closed :( >> >> Sometimes retirement centers rent out the rec. room spaces to outside agencies to help keep costs down... How about local schools that may allow the use of auditoriums, lunch rooms or gymnasiums? Local community colleges seem to be pretty easy to infiltrate...perhaps you could carry your program over to them. I think my heart would break if my school closed down... Good Luck - -Cheree ------------------------------ From: Chereecharmello@aol.com Date: Thu, 9 Aug 2001 12:19:14 EDT Subject: the_dojang: Re: The_Dojang-Digest V8 #470 Here's a question to start a new thread: Do you think it is really possible to teach a student to fight, or perhaps is it only possible to enhance an innate ability? I understand (and have experienced) that repetition and technical awareness can improve one's ability to fight, but some people just seem to never really 'get it.' Is it possible that kinesthetic learners make better fighters? - -Cheree ------------------------------ From: "Rudy Timmerman" Date: Thu, 09 Aug 2001 03:04:59 -0400 Subject: the_dojang: Belt Ray writes: >> I simply gave him a pain belt in return. > > Rudy, > > Freudian slip, or is a pain belt one of those old KSW techniques? :) Hello Ray: I almost fell of my chair when I saw that typo. The belt was simply PLAIN, but there are some pain techniques that can be done with the belt. Sorry I did not think of that at the time:) Sincerely, Rudy ------------------------------ From: "Rudy Timmerman" Date: Thu, 09 Aug 2001 03:59:58 -0400 Subject: the_dojang: Still with it Illona writes: > ... that girl from our school didn't stay with the arts > much longer than a year or so ... so we didn't have our butts beat for too > long. We are still with it and she isn't. :-) Hi Illona: Sad enough, that is what often happens with students in such cases. Once I "cleaned house", and threw out all of the students above green belt. Some might think this was a drastic move, but this is sometimes unavoidable when the school owner gets a little older, and the younger Black Belts feel they need to challenge the rooster of the coup. The Black Belt who boasted that he would "run me out of town" started his own school, and before long he lost his wife, his home, and his school to bankruptcy. The end result for me was a phenominal growth in my school that had been sliding along suffering from a poor attitude in the upper ranks. Fortunately his wife later returned. On another occasion I had my school raided by the person I left in charge while I was out of the country (setting up a school for one of my students). Most of the students that were "talked into" leaving with him are also no longer in the arts, and a number of them have expressed regret they left me. In this instance, that action caused me to resign from the association I had so diligently supported for years. The association gained about thirty students (they already had), but lost those who resigned with me. Ironically, a number of schools from that association later joined my association because of such politics. Nearly all of the students who left my school are no longer involved in martial arts. Some of them had much more talent than I ever had, but I guess talent is just not enough. The net loss to my old association was far greater than it would have been had they simply honored their own license agreement by refusing to accept the new school. The martial arts community in general suffered because of the ill will that the rift caused, tournaments turned into free for alls, judges jumped into the fray with biased calls, and the public was shown a side of martial arts that completely turned them off. Everyone loses, and that is why I felt a need to nip the problem in the bud with my young Black Belt. Perhaps my telling the young lad to hit the road needed a bit more explaining when I first posted it. With regards to his belt and uniform. Even in the boondocks of Northern Canada, we can't just take back something that was sold. In this case, the property was not sold. Sincerely, Rudy ------------------------------ From: Ray Terry Date: Thu, 9 Aug 2001 14:10:11 -0700 (PDT) Subject: the_dojang: KSR 2001-15: _Generals and Scholars_, by Edward J. Shultz Forwarded msg... _Generals and Scholars: Military Rule in Medieval Korea_, by Edward J. Shultz. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2000. Preface, Appendixes, Notes, Bibliography, Index + 254 pages. ISBN: 0-8248-2188-2, cloth; ISBN: 0-8248-2324-9, paper. Reviewed by James Lewis Oxford University [This review first appeared in _Acta Koreana_, 4 (2001): 179-84. _Acta Koreana_ is published by Academia Koreana of Keimyung University.] Edward Shultz has done us a great service by bringing into print an expanded version of his doctoral dissertation, completed at the University of Hawai'i in 1976. In nine chapters and an introduction, he examines the political history of the KoryO dynasty from 1170 to 1258, a period usually called the Military Era. His conclusions on the institutional confrontations and their resolutions that developed over these eight decades extend far beyond 1258 and have implications for the founding of the succeeding ChosOn dynasty and even for the political economy of Korea through the late nineteenth century. Studies in English on the KoryO period are few and those in print are even fewer, so we should welcome this elucidation of a complex time when military officials usurped power and ruled in all but name. In 1170, King Uijong was dethroned by a military coup, and for the next twenty-five years, the survival of the dynasty was in jeopardy as strong men fought over power. General Ch'oe Ch'unghOn emerged in 1196 as the victor, brought the dynasty back from the brink of ruin, and achieved sufficient stability to pass power to his son. In fact, the Ch'oe House ruled from behind the throne for four generations or until 1258, when civilian officials displaced them and negotiated a peace with the Mongol invaders. The period of Ch'oe rule saw challenges of epochal proportions: rebellions, massive foreign invasions, and the removal of the capital to Kanghwa Island. Ch'oe governance responded with the creation of an elaborate private system of governance that manipulated dynastic institutions and political (Confucian) and religious (Buddhist) ideologies and that relied heavily on retainers and personal loyalties. Ch'oe genius was to retain older political structures while transforming and extending them. The period saw the maintenance of traditional social elites, the extensive use of marriage alliances and kinship ties, the continuation of Buddhism as a significant economic and political factor, the retention of KoryO kingship for its legitimating power, and the promotion of civil ideals and structures for their ability to produce bureaucratic expertise. The Ch'oe House introduced new trends as well as furthering old. In particular, the military seized power in 1170, because relations between the civil and military branches of government had reached a nadir, but by the end of the Military Era, both halves of the elite had achieved a stable accommodation with the other. Ironically, the Ch'oe support of civil norms and maintenance of the dynastic organs meant that its private system of governance would eventually be displaced as soon as the military leadership appeared weak or was unable to command sufficient personal respect. As long as the military dictators relied on the king for legitimacy and used Confucian education as a qualification for bureaucratic advancement, they left themselves vulnerable to a re-assertion of civilian and royal perogatives. Even Ch'oe House retainers were incorporated into the civil dynastic structure, thereby diluting loyalty to their military masters. SOn Buddhism was taken up and received sponsorship from the military quarter, but SOn offers no political philosophy and so could not rival the Confucian establishment with its focus on the king and concern with the international politico-cultural order centered on China. The Ch'oe House suppressed upstart social groups such as slaves and peasants, reasserted a pre-coup social hierarchy, and worked hard to make the older economic structures pay bureaucratic salaries. In so doing, they won support from established clans. In short, the Ch'oe rulers reinvigorated the dynasty, but their very success paved the road to their downfall. The long-term legacies of Ch'oe rule were multiple. The success of SOn strengthened a popular Buddhism that emerged as a credible rival to the more elitist Kyo sect. SOn offered a speculative philosophy that was to assist the introduction of Neo-Confucianism in the late thirteenth century. Buddhist syncretism during this period, typified by Chinul, Hyesim, and Yose was paralleled in secular thought and society by the emerging rapprochement between the civil and military officials. In suppressing peasant revolts and purging the lowborn from high offices, the Ch'oe dictators forestalled social revolution. Ch'oe restoration of a viable dynastic tax structure allowed the land stipend system (prebends for officials) to work, and brought in taxes for the operation of central government, at least until capitulation to the Mongols. Nevertheless, the resurrection and expansion of sigUp (prebends based on the number of households, not land area) as rewards for loyalty and to pay Ch'oe expenses created a trend towards the greater privatization of land and led to the appearance of the great latifundia of the late KoryO period and the eventual impoverishment of the dynasty. At the risk of misrepresentation and omission, these are the general conclusions of the study, except, that is, for one that is striking in its suggestiveness. To reiterate, the Ch'oe House sponsored Confucian norms and relied on the throne, while simultaneously using private institutions to impose actual rule. The dual public/private structure sowed the seeds of the eventual destruction of private governance at the hands of a reinvigorated civil government. Shultz is convincing in his argument, but perhaps he over-weights his analysis and continues, "[w]ith or without the Mongols, the Ch'oe House and military rule would not have survived KoryO's civil tradition" (p. 186). Of course, Korean politics were determined first and foremost by Koreans, but the impact of the Khitan and Mongol invasions seems short-changed. On the next page, Shultz asserts, "the security of the kingdom became the responsibility of the Ch'oe House ..." Presumably, the Ch'oe House was unable to defend the kingdom against the Mongols and this must have contributed greatly to a loss of legitimacy and ultimate demise, much as the inability of the Tokugawa bakufu to keep foreigners away in the mid-nineteenth century opened the door for a revolt of the domains. More discussion on the Mongols follows below after we link this point to another provocative innovation. Shultz exposes us to the fresh breeze of comparative history by introducing Japanese military government. He draws a number of interesting comparisons between the character of Ch'oe House rule and the Kamakura government in Japan, even going so far as to write: "[t]hat the rise of the warrior class in Japan dovetails with the rise of the military in Korea highlights the need to study these two cultures in concert." (p. xi) The Kamakura bakufu initiated a series of military governments in Japan that lasted until 1868, and so the obvious question is why Korea followed a different path. The key differences highlighted by Shultz are that the Kamakura situation produced vassals, whereas the Ch'oe House developed only retainers (lacking elaborate ceremony or benefices). The Ch'oe House governed from the dynastic capital, but the Kamakura bakufu located itself away from Kyoto. Finally, the Kamakura situation was one of dispersed, decentralized power, whereas the KoryO kingdom required a strong central army to defend itself from attack. Returning to the question of the role of the Mongols, the invasion factor seems to relate directly to the comparison with Japan. The Mongols supplied a large and overwhelming imperative for the reassertion of civil authority: KoryO required centralization to survive. This was most easily achieved within the existing dynastic structures. Without the Mongols, it is conceivable that the Ch'oe House or another military successor may have evolved away from the dynastic government and established itself in a similar fashion to the Kamakura bakufu. In this sense, Shultz's comparison with Kamakura may not be as apt as a comparison that might start with institutional developments under the Heian court, leading to the period of Taira Kiyomori following the Hogen and Heiji disturbances of 1156 and 1159, through the Genpei War of 1180, to the establishment of the Kamakura bakufu under Minamoto Yoritomo. Taira Kiyomori, like Ch'oe Ch'unghOn, did not locate his power outside the dynastic establishment, but sought to use the existing structure for his own ends. In institutional terms, Kiyomori may have been no more than a Yi Uimin-type figure (a lowborn slave with too many ambitions), but Yoritomo's innovations in Kamakura may offer a glimpse of where the Ch'oe House could have gone with the further development of sigUp, private armies, and no Mongol invasion. Of course, Yoritomo did not have the Khitans and the Mongols threatening his country, and Japan could afford the luxury of decentralization. Shultz's argument leads to a conclusion that downplays the impact of the Mongols, but his hypothesis of internal factors being more important than external factors is untestable and, although provocative, must remain only a hypothesis. Shultz's attempt to introduce comparisons is brave and must be applauded, no matter how modest they are at this initial stage. For example, no comparisons are attempted between the popularity among military elites of SOn in Korea and Zen in Japan. No comparison is attempted between the two social histories or whether incidences of unrest or problems of social mobility were similar or different. No comparison is made with revenue sources. These are large questions worthy of serious comparative study, and this book cannot be faulted for ignoring them. Interested readers may want to consult Shultz's recent article in Japan Review for more on comparisons between Korea and Japan (see Edward J. Shultz, "Ch'oe Ch'unghUn and Minamoto Yoritomo," _Japan Review_, no. 11 (1999): 31-53. ). Finally, on the topic of comparisons, we might also consider the Sung military model and its failures for some of the reasons behind KoryO's emphasis on civilian leadership. Shultz's book is very informative on a number of important matters. For example, the vision of the "young, foolish, and stupid" (and corpulent) Ch'oe Ui trying to flee over a wall and escape his assassins is priceless for what it tells us about leadership qualities. Of course, the core of the book is its extensive examination of the institutional arrangements for governance. There are a few places where more information on broader circumstances would have helped, or if it is there, this reader overlooked it. For example, there seems to be no summation of how Shultz views the conduct and significance of the Khitan and Mongol invasions. The invaders appear here and there, and although this is not his story to tell, given the very interesting hypothesis mentioned above, a more comprehensive assessment would have helped. We get a few inklings of how the KoryO government continued to function from Kanghwa Island, but one can imagine that eluding and attacking Mongol forces while trying to govern and collect taxes with difficult lines of communications and transport must have consumed a large part of the day-to-day running of the government. A few minor quibbles follow. In 976, King KyOngjong introduced the chOnsikwa "whereby the state granted prebendal rights from paddy land and woodland to officials, military officers, and other government agents." (p. 4) One wonders how much "paddy land" existed in KoryO in the tenth century. Tongnae is not near modern Pusan; it is one of the northern wards of the city and the original core of the city. (p. 14) The KyOllyong Army is obviously a key player in the coup of 1170, but its position within the list of armies (p. 5) is not clarified, and the reader is left guessing its size and position. It would have been useful to have Ch'oe Ch'unghOn's ten-point proposal in an appendix for easy reference. The final quibble is not with the author, but with the University of Hawai'i Press. There is no glossary with Chinese characters. In fact, there are no characters at all. This is a recurring failure of the Press to modernize itself. Such stubborn refusal to join the modern world of multilingual publishing is now more than an annoyance; it is an embarrassment. Finally, there are a few last comments I would like to make concerning the points of view that emerge in the book. The scene is surveyed from the sources available, and so it would be surprising if the author's view could have escaped completely from those biases. While reading the book, one has to recall that the subjects of the study are actually a rather narrow group of elites (perhaps no more than a few hundred?) located in the capital. The book is an examination of palace coups among this group. Although there is some consideration given to revolts in various regions, there is little or no concern with the interaction of the regions with the center and how that interaction may create limitations on elite activities. This is apparent in the discussion of the immediate post-coup situation: "[t]o stabilize the peasantry, sound administration was imperative." (p. 39) Sound administration was certainly imperative, but the best laid central plans are still hostage to the mechanisms of local rule, to weather, disease, and invasion. For example, what was the disposition of military forces in the land? How did the center administer provinces and localities? Where were the Mongol forces and what did they control? Were there lean harvest years, years of bad weather, outbreaks of disease? Can we detect the agricultural cycle in the actions of the government and the movement of military forces? In short, what constraints on the center derived from these military, political, and natural forces? The center acts and so goes the country; this is a conceit built on a belief in the efficacy of central government, a conceit that permeates the KoryOsa and the KoryOsa chOryo, products of the age of ChosOn state-building. I have already mentioned the question of the impact of invasion, but other, large contextual and institutional issues that restrict the reach of the center perhaps deserve some treatment. Another inherent bias in the sources and within political history in general is the common belief in elite qualifications for rule. For example, much is made of individuals' fitness for high office (p. 31); this is linked to experience, and experience would have been available only to those of high social origins. Therefore, fitness for office begins with high social origins. Not to discount experience, but this view is an assumption that underlies an ideology designed to maintain the rule of certain socially connected people, be they fifteenth-century Confucian ideologues (editors of the KoryOsa perhaps?), or even members of the KoryO elite in 1170. Ch'oe Ch'unghOn himself, although the scion of a distinguished lineage, came from a military line, perpetrated a palace coup, and seized power. His acts were highly irregular, and one dares to point out that his experiences did not prepare him for the role of military dictator. His appointments of civil officials from high social origins did not necessarily result in good government; in fact, Shultz tells us that the origins of the 1170 coup lay in the corruption of civil government. The appointments certainly resulted in a cooptation of the elite lineages receiving them, but it is dangerous to assume much more. Shultz offers evidence for better government as a result of the exclusion of slaves and lowborn, but the situation seems ambiguous: were the improvements more than just greater efficiencies in revenue collection or the deft use of the coercive powers of the state, and was the greater stability achieved by the dynastic government or did it stem from the dictatorial power of private Ch'oe rule? If the latter, then we are left with little more than "Might makes right." None of the points raised above detract from the value of this publication. It is an extremely welcome contribution and opens doors on a period all too often overlooked in English-language scholarship on Korea, so obsessed, as it seems to be, with modern history. Citation: Lewis, James. 2001 Review of _Generals and Scholars: Military Rule in Medieval Korea_, by Edward J. Shultz, (2000) Korean Studies Review_ 2001, no. 15 Electronic file: http://www.iic.edu/thelist/review/ksr01-15.htm ------------------------------ From: Ray Terry Date: Thu, 09 Aug 2001 14:54:22 PDT Subject: the_dojang: . ------------------------------ End of The_Dojang-Digest V8 #471 ******************************** It's a great day for Taekwondo! Support the USTU by joining today. US Taekwondo Union, 1 Olympic Plaza, Ste 104C, Colorado Spgs, CO 80909 719-578-4632 FAX 719-578-4642 ustutkd1@aol.com http://www.ustu.org To unsubscribe from the_dojang-digest send the command: unsubscribe the_dojang-digest -or- unsubscribe the_dojang-digest your.old@address in the BODY (top line, left justified) of a "plain text" e-mail addressed to majordomo@hpwsrt.cup.hp.com. Old digest issues are available via ftp://ftp.martialartsresource.com. Copyright 1994-2001: Ray Terry and Martial Arts Resource Standard disclaimers apply.