Date: Tue, 30 Mar 2004 03:01:50 -0800 From: the_dojang-request@martialartsresource.net Subject: The_Dojang digest, Vol 11 #151 - 7 msgs X-Mailer: Mailman v2.0.13.cisto1 MIME-version: 1.0 Content-type: text/plain To: the_dojang@martialartsresource.net Errors-To: the_dojang-admin@martialartsresource.net X-BeenThere: the_dojang@martialartsresource.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.0.13.cisto1 Precedence: bulk Reply-To: the_dojang@martialartsresource.net X-Reply-To: the_dojang@martialartsresource.net X-Subscribed-Address: kma@martialartsresource.com List-Id: The Internet's premier discussion forum on Korean Martial Arts. List-Post: List-Subscribe: , List-Unsubscribe: , List-Help: Status: O X-Status: X-Keywords: Send The_Dojang mailing list submissions to the_dojang@martialartsresource.net To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit http://martialartsresource.net/mailman/listinfo/the_dojang or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to the_dojang-request@martialartsresource.net You can reach the person managing the list at the_dojang-admin@martialartsresource.net When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific than "Re: Contents of The_Dojang digest..." <<------------------ The_Dojang mailing list ------------------>> Serving the Internet since June 1994. Copyright 1994-2004: Ray Terry and Martial Arts Resource The Internet's premier discussion forum devoted to Korean Martial Arts. 1600 members. See the Korean Martial Arts (KMA) FAQ and the online search engine for back issues of The_Dojang at http://MartialArtsResource.com Pil Seung! Today's Topics: 1. Korean words for Zero... (Master Arce) 2. Korean Crisis and Recovery (Ray Terry) 3. Re:Eternal..?? (Klaas Barends) 4. RE: Fast (Rick Clark) 5. Seminars (Rudy Timmerman) 6. RE: ATA (Rick Clark) 7. 30 years of fun:) (Rudy Timmerman) --__--__-- Message: 1 Date: Mon, 29 Mar 2004 16:05:45 -0800 (PST) From: Master Arce To: the_dojang@martialartsresource.net Subject: [The_Dojang] Korean words for Zero... Reply-To: the_dojang@martialartsresource.net Frank, I gave credit to the site from where the info came. It says that Yong or Gong would be the Koren word for Zero. I thought that was in my post???? Steve Greetings, all... **As someone mentioned (sorry, don't have the post saved), the Koreans have two different sets of numbers, and they use them for different purposes. I think what that site was trying to say is there is not "native Korean" word for zero. They do have two words that are borrowed from Chinese, just like one of their numbering systems was. I have asked one of my Korean friends for a clarification of which zero is used in which case, but have not heard back from him yet... So they probably have had a word for zero, just not a native Korean word. Much of their language is borrowed from Chinese, so this is not necessarily a big surprise... <> - Bert Edens Springdale, Arkansas ** The person was/is: Me, Steve Arce. And thank you Bert for your help!!! --------------------------------- Do you Yahoo!? Yahoo! Finance Tax Center - File online. File on time. --__--__-- Message: 2 From: Ray Terry To: the_dojang@martialartsresource.net (The_Dojang) Date: Mon, 29 Mar 2004 17:12:51 -0800 (PST) Subject: [The_Dojang] Korean Crisis and Recovery Reply-To: the_dojang@martialartsresource.net Korean Crisis and Recovery, by David T. Coe and Kim Se-Jik (eds), 2002. Seoul: International Monetary Fund and Korea Institute for International Economic Policy. 531 pages. (ISBN 1-589-06068-7) reviewed by Bernhard Seliger Hanns Seidel Stiftung bjseliger@yahoo.de When the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and South Korea concluded the largest IMF rescue package ever in early December 1997, with an overall volume of US$ 57 billion, it came as a shock to the Koreans, who just that year had entered the OECD, the club of highly developed nations. Only a few years earlier South Korea had been the most prominent showcase for the "East Asian miracle" promoted by the World Bank and were for several decades world leaders in economic growth. While the causes of the economic and financial crisis of 1997 and 1998 were manifold and not in the least related to the decade-old economic structures of the country, the policies of the IMF soon came to be regarded very critically not only by the Korean population, but also by many Korean economists. The rise of the interest rate, in particular, was seen as a reason for the grave recession South Korea faced in 1998, when its economy shrank by almost six percent. (The overnight call rate, the most important short-term interest rate, increased from 12 percent in early December 1997 to 32 percent by the 26th of the month). Indeed, the situation became popularly known as the "IMF" crisis. When the program goals of the IMF changed five times between January 1998 and February 1999, the adjustments were at best seen as a sign for a policy failure of the IMF, and, at worst, as part of a conspiracy to bring down the formerly successful Korean economy. However, as much as the situation drastically worsened in 1997 and 1998, the following two years, 1999 and 2000 saw an equally impressive macro-economic comeback for the Korean economy, with record growth rates, low inflation, greatly improved unemployment data and record inflows of foreign investment. So, when in May 2001, four years after the outbreak of the economic and financial crisis, the International Monetary Fund and the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP) jointly organized a conference in Seoul to look back at the lessons of the economic and financial crisis, they also could look back at a recovery at breath-taking speed. Hence, the title "Korean Crisis and Recovery" for a 2002 book that collects the papers of this conference seems indeed appropriate. The objective of the collection of articles is to look back at what lessons can be drawn from the Korean crisis and recovery, by inviting Korean and non-Korean economists alike to discuss this topic. Included among these commentators are a number of IMF and World Bank staff members, who were themselves partly involved in policy-making during the crisis. The 13 papers plus the comments on them by distinguished economists cover a number of important aspects related to the crisis. It is enlightening to see that conflicting views on the crisis not only exist between Korean and non-Korean economists, but also among Korean economists themselves: thus, Cho Yoon-Je's critical analysis of the efficacy of the high interest policy prescribed by the IMF at the beginning of the crisis is not only challenged by the IMF team's evaluation (which incidentally offers an excellent introduction to the relevant issues), and by commentator Barry Eichengreen, but also by Chung Chae-Shik and Kim Se-Jik, whose empirical analysis of high interest rates and the exchange rate follows Cho's piece. In addition to overview articles by an IMF-team consisting of Ajai Chopra, Kenneth Kang, Meral Karasulu, Hong Liang, Henry Ma, Anthony Richards and the aforementioned Cho Yoon-Je), in-depth analyses of the most important aspects of the crisis appear. These include the article on the high interest rate cited above, and articles on the labor market (Kim Dae-Il), economic growth (Robert J. Barro), the recovery in Asia (Park Yung-Chul and Lee Jong-Wha), the international financial system (Barry Eichengreen) and the Korean exchange rate policy (Michael Dooley, Rudi Dornbusch and Park Yung-Chul). It is not surprising that issues related to the private sector and financial reform are quite prominent, since these two areas remained among the unresolved problems of Korean economic restructuring after the crisis. Indeed, financial sector restructuring is still not completed now in 2004. An overview of private sector reform is given by William P. Mako; Oh Gyu-Taeg and Rhee Chang-Yong discuss the role of the corporate bond market; Eric Friedman, Simon Johnson and Todd Mitton treat corporate governance and debt issues in Asia; and Kim Woo-Chan and Byeon Yang-Ho discuss the short-term debts of Korean banks. Each paper follows quite a quite different approach, ranging from econometric modelling to narratives of events in the crisis. Overall, this volume is a highly useful compendium on the Korean economic and financial crisis and its aftermath. However, it is surprising that although institutional factors are cited in most papers as influencing the outcome (i.e. effectiveness) of policies, they rarely receive more than a bare mention. Along with the transformation of economies in Central and Eastern Europe since 1989, the East Asian crisis has been one of the world's most major and unexpected economic events of the last generation. The lack of analysis of the interplay of formal and informal institutions and the cultural embeddedness of institutions, the focus of the so-called New Institutional Economics, has been a major cause for these events taking so many by surprise. In the discussion of the crisis itself as well the inability to employ the insights of New Institutional Economics is highly problematic. For example, the various measurements of progress in corporate restructuring in Korea can be highly misleading if the de facto relations between owner-families and subsidiaries of Korean conglomerates (chaebol) are not taken into account. After the economic crisis revealed the extent of overinvestment by chaebol, divestment by sale, merger or closure of units has been the goal of economic policy. However, holding or "virtual holding" companies exert a persistent influence on former daughters through personal relationship networks, even after they almost completely divest their shares of subsidiaries. The ongoing fight for control among Hyundai subsidiaries well exemplifies this unresolved problem. A view that does not consider institutions, however, can easily mislead since at a formal level chaebol have gotten rid of hundreds of subsidiaries. In sum, this collection of articles is a fascinating starting point for debate about the lessons from the Korean economic crisis and recovery, but not at all a finished result. Citation: Seliger, Bernhard 2004 Korean Crisis and Recovery, by David T. Coe and Kim Se-Jik (eds.), (2002) Korean Studies Review 2004, no. 06 Electronic file: http://koreaweb.ws/ks/ksr/ksr04-06.htm --__--__-- Message: 3 Date: Tue, 30 Mar 2004 10:26:25 +0800 From: Klaas Barends To: the_dojang@martialartsresource.net Subject: [The_Dojang] Re:Eternal..?? Reply-To: the_dojang@martialartsresource.net > in the ATA where Eternal Grandmaster's H.U. Lee's vision holds us to a Eternal Grandmaster..???? Wow, I gotta add this one to my list of crappy titles. There is actually a human being out there who lets people call him Eternal Grandmaster? Where does this end? -- mvg. Klaas Barends http://www.hapkido.nl/ --__--__-- Message: 4 From: "Rick Clark" To: Subject: RE: [The_Dojang] Fast Date: Mon, 29 Mar 2004 21:19:29 -0500 Reply-To: the_dojang@martialartsresource.net Hi Ray, > From: Ray Terry [mailto:rterry@idiom.com] > > > > > A year for a black belt? Sounds a little quick! > > > > > > Yep, very fast... outside of Korea. In Korea, not too uncommon, or so > > > I understand. But then they are in the dojang about twice as often > per > > > week as is common in the US. > > > > In my experience while in Korea it was that someone could do 2 or 3 days > a > > week with an hour of training and end up with a 1st dan in 12 months. I > you > > would stay on for another year you would make 2nd dan with no problem. > So > > you could go from nothing to 2nd dan in 2 years. > > Yep. But it is fairly rare for a person to only train 2 or 3 days a week > in Korea, as I understand it. I have not been there for a extended > stay... Nope it was not that rare. The GI's were (and I expect the same holds true now) more interested in the "girls" (fill in your worst translation of girls), booze, party, etc. Martial Arts tended not to be a high priority of the GI's unless they were already in the Martial Arts. I was a black belt when I went to Korea - I did spend just about every day training I could but I did still find time for things that were not martial arts related. > > They seem to expect more of a five to six day a week schedule, seven if > there is a demo scheduled on the off day. Yep the military does. We would be on a work schedule that sometimes would be 20 or 30 days without a day off and work rotating shifts of 3 - 3 - 3. So even if you would want to train daily it would be very hard to get a couple of days in a row in the dochang. > > Ray Terry > rterry@idiom.com Rick Clark www.ao-denkou-kai.org --__--__-- Message: 5 Date: Mon, 29 Mar 2004 21:24:01 -0500 From: Rudy Timmerman To: the_dojang@martialartsresource.net Subject: [The_Dojang] Seminars Reply-To: the_dojang@martialartsresource.net Greetings everyone: I just returned home safely from my trip to Austin, and I am glad to be on solid ground again (hate flying). As was reported by several other DDers, we had a fantastic time, and Master Thomasand his wife are solely responsible for me having gained several pounds. He and his lovely wife were wonderful hosts, and the OPIE experience in eating a true Texas BBQ will stay with me forever (as the pounds likely will too:(. I like to thank the many masters and students for participating, and I will tell you that you have given me much more than I was able to share with you. Thank you! In fact, had it not been for Master Thomas hosting this seminar, I would have never seen the true origin of Tang Soo Do's hyung as was aptly displayed by PSN Wicker at the cranium portion of the party (and I though I looked ridiculous humming William Tell:). It was a blast meeting my old friend GM Mc Murray unexpectedly, and I am exceedingly happy with the many new friends I made. In closing, I am happy to report that USKMAF and NKMAA members have once again proven that martial artists actually CAN coexist without any need for distrust or animosity, and those participants who were not with one of these two organizations most certainly let it be known that this wonderful cooperation between not just these two, but a number of, organizations was a happy experience for them. As such, I am confident we will see them again at future seminars hosted by EITHER organization (as well as the orgs of newfound friends). Having said that, I hope that anyone who can make it will support Master West's 6th Annual CWMAI Hapkido Clinic in Mosinee. Sincerely, Rudy --__--__-- Message: 6 From: "Rick Clark" To: Subject: RE: [The_Dojang] ATA Date: Mon, 29 Mar 2004 21:36:14 -0500 Reply-To: the_dojang@martialartsresource.net Hi Thomas, > From: Thomas Gordon [mailto:tgordon@gordonmartialarts.com] > It is true that one bad apple can spoil the bunch. However, when it comes > to ATA, it's more like a few good apples and a big mess of bad ones. >I have been told by a few black belts (one fairly high ranking) > that the state of Texas is "owned" by one very high ranking ATA black > belt. If I remember correctly, one man spoke of $100,000 to "buy" > territory plus he'd have to give up all testing fees. Some time back I was give a memo that detailed the way testing fees were done in ATA. After several moves I have seemed to have misplaced the document but perhaps you could tell me if memory servers me right. It was something to the effect if you were able to test your students you would get 50% of the test fee and then if you were under 5th dan (as I remember) you would send 25% to the ATA headquarters and 25% to your 5th dan instructor. If your instructor would drop out of the ATA then you would send the full 50% to ATA headquarters. Like I said my memory is a bit vague but it did seem rather like a pyramid scheme at the time. I wonder if they still do the same thing or something similar? Anyway - if this guy had a lot of the Texas schools and did give up the test fees the amount of money he gave up I would guess would be more than the $100,000 he may have paid for the "territory". Rather a good scheme for someone I would think. > Thomas Gordon > Florida Rick Clark www.ao-denkou-kai.org --__--__-- Message: 7 Date: Mon, 29 Mar 2004 21:43:29 -0500 From: Rudy Timmerman To: the_dojang@martialartsresource.net Subject: [The_Dojang] 30 years of fun:) Reply-To: the_dojang@martialartsresource.net Master DeWitt writes: > Are any of the students in attendance at this past NKMAA seminar > intending to be present April 3rd, 2004 at Grandmaster Timmerman's > thirtieth > anniversary in the Sault? Hello Master DeWitt: I hope you are feeling well soon. We missed you in Austin, and I'd hate to see you miss my anniversary bash as well. I guess I best explain the occasion, before folks make the wrong assumption about the anniversary. It simply is something I threw together to celebrate thirty years of owning and operating my own school (after teaching for others so many years, it was about time). It is also thirty years since I first organized and registered the National Korean Martial Arts Association. To celebrate this double whammy, I will host a free seminar at my school on the morning of Saturday, April 3rd. After the seminar, we will have a nice (but cheap) dinner, and we close the evening with dancing 'till we drop. I expect that I'll be the last one standing again (they just don't make em like they used to:). All kidding aside, I extend this invitation to all DDers, and I'll be VERY happy to see you there to celebrate the occasion with me. Please let us know you are coming, so we can leave on the light. To Lawren, thanks for the nice comments about the Austin seminar. I truly enjoyed working with you, and I'll save a dance for you a the next HKD shindig as you called it:) To Lois HSN, I'd like to wish you a speedy and complete recovery:) Sincerely, Rudy --__--__-- _______________________________________________ The_Dojang mailing list The_Dojang@martialartsresource.net http://martialartsresource.net/mailman/listinfo/the_dojang http://the-dojang.net Old digest issues @ ftp://ftp.martialartsresource.com/pub/the_dojang Copyright 1994-2004: Ray Terry and http://MartialArtsResource.com Standard disclaimers apply. Remember September 11. End of The_Dojang Digest